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Investment under uncertainty 
Dynamic programming 
A B S T R A C T   
This article considers an incumbent’s product innovation decision within an uncertain framework, where the 
firm decides whether to continue selling the established product. The model being dynamic allows to analyze the 
trade-off between an early innovation where the new product only slightly improves the existing one, or inno-
vating late with a much better new product. We find that the effect of uncertainty is that it raises the value of the 
strategy where the firm keeps on producing the old product after innovating. This results in earlier investment if 
the firm stays active on the established product market after adopting the new product, and that it keeps on 
producing the established product for a longer time after the product innovation. Limited uncertainty could lead 
to a non-monotonicity: with a better new product it is not optimal to innovate, whereas innovating is optimal 
with a worse one.   
1. Introduction 
In order to keep demand for its products at a sustainable level, from 
time to time a firm needs to carry out product innovations. When 
innovating the firm needs to think about many aspects. First of all it is 
the timing. Innovating early has the advantage that the firm increases 
revenue soon. However, on the other hand it takes time to develop a new 
product of reasonable quality, so if a firm innovates early the 
improvement will not be too big compared to the quality of the existing 
products, and the resulting revenue increase will be limited. Innovating 
late obviously means that for a long time the firm just sells the estab-
lished product(s), so that there will be no early boost in its revenue level. 
The upside of innovating late is that due to technological progress the 
innovation frontier has moved up considerably compared to what the 
firm is currently producing. This means that the innovative product’s 
quality level is much higher, which in general will result in a consid-
erable increase of the firm’s product demand level and therewith, 
revenue. 
A second aspect that a firm needs to take into account when it carries 
out a product innovation is what to do with the existing product market. 
In most of the literature models are developed in which product inno-
vation implies that the firm replaces the established product by the new 
one (see, among many others, (Saha, 2007) and (Letina, 2016)). In other 
words, the firm stops selling its old product at the moment the innova-
tive product is launched. However, what frequently happens in reality is 
that the new product is added to the firm’s existing product portfolio. 
Hence, the firm simultaneously sells the existing and the new product, 
the obvious benefit being that it collects revenues from both these 
products. On the other hand starting to sell the new product will 
cannibalize demand of the existing product. This is the case when 
products are strategic substitutes. Moreover, continuing to sell the old 
product also jeopardizes the revenue of the new product. This is because 
consumers exist that are not willing to pay extra for some new features 
associated with the innovation. So they prefer to keep on buying the old 
product. The result is that the firm is “competing with itself”, which will 
reduce the revenue of both the old and the new product. The focus of our 
article is on a problem that, although of practical importance, did not 
receive too much attention in the literature. Namely, we focus on the 
choice between “add” and “replace”, i.e., whenever it carries out its 
product innovation the firm has to choose between abolishing the old 
market, or keeping it. Of course, in the latter case the firm still has the 
option to stop selling the established product after some time. 
GM’s investment in robotaxis is a recent example of such a decision 
problem. GM paid $1bn in 2016 for Cruise, an artificial-intelligence 
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startup, therewith, adopting the technological know how to produce 
autonomous vehicles.1 And the “marriage of cutting-edge technology 
and large-scale manufacturing seems to be paying off” according to The 
Economist (January 25th, 2018). GM is now able to mass-produce self- 
driving cars. GM expects that the costs of ride-hailing services, will fall 
from $2.50 a mile now to about $1 as the main expense–the driver–is 
eliminated. On the long term this would mean that car buyers become 
car users as drivers are lured from their cars to robotaxis (The Economist, 
January 25th, 2018). Therewith, GM’s current main business of sup-
plying vehicles to drive will decline, eventually being completely 
replaced by the new business of self-driving cars. 
The third aspect of product innovation is how large the production 
capacity of the new product should be. Such a decision has obvious 
trade-offs. In general it is not known how consumers will react to new 
products. Therefore, firms have to take into account that new product 
demand could be lower than expected. This will obviously be bad for 
profitability especially if the firm has installed a large new product ca-
pacity. However, in case consumers like this new product a lot, revenue 
will grow sky-high once the firm is able to respond by putting large 
quantities on the market. Moreover, the decision to keep on selling the 
existing product or not, will have its own implications for the optimal 
capacity level. 
Many contributions can be found just analyzing the first aspect, i.e. 
the timing of the investment. This is carried out in the real options 
literature, see, e.g., (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) and (Trigeorgis, 1996), 
and, more related to innovation, in Reinganum (1981) and Farzin et al. 
(1998) (see also (Doraszelski, 2001)). We also take a real options 
approach, which is especially suitable because our demand system is 
subject to stochastic shocks. A contribution that combines the first and 
the second aspect, so how to time the innovation and deciding on 
whether to keep on producing the established product or not, is (Hag-
spiel et al., 2019). Combining the first and the third aspect, i.e. let the 
firm not only decide on the timing but also on the size of the investment, 
has been done for the first time in Dangl (1999) and Bar-Ilan and Strange 
(1996), and later in Huisman and Kort (2015). These contributions and 
the original real options models have in common that they treat in-
vestment projects as being lumpy. A different approach in which 
capacity/capital stock develops continuously over time and investment 
is incremental, is followed in, e.g., (Grenadier, 2002) and (Evans and 
Guthrie, 2012). However, to the best of our knowledge, no contributions 
exist that combine all three aspects in one framework. This is what the 
present article does. 
We employ a stochastic dynamic model of the firm to analyze the 
firm’s innovation decision in such a setting. Initially the firm is active on 
an established product market. Over time new technologies arrive at 
beforehand unknown points in time. The firm has the option to carry out 
a product innovation. The way the firm innovates is that it is not active 
in pursuing R&D itself.2 Instead, what the firm is doing is that it chooses 
the optimal time to adopt a new technology to produce a corresponding 
new product. This new product is horizontally and vertically differen-
tiated from the established product. The longer it waits with adopting, 
the better the new product is that it can produce, implying that the level 
of vertical differentiation is higher. Innovating goes along with investing 
in the capacity level of the new product. The firm needs to choose the 
optimal capacity level, which determines the size of the innovation in-
vestment. In addition the firm needs to decide whether it will keep on 
producing the established product or not. If it decides to continue this 
production process it still has the option to discontinue this process at 
some later point in time, after which it will solely be active on the 
innovative product market. In other words, after the firm has chosen for 
the add strategy, it needs to determine the optimal time to switch from 
“add” to “replace”, if at all. 
Analyzing a framework that simultaneously takes into account the 
timing of the innovation, the decision whether to add or to replace, and 
the size of the capacity level associated with producing the new product, 
has led to the following results. First, we consider the effect of uncer-
tainty, which is the model input extending the current literature of 
versioning (see, e.g., (Agi and Yan, 2020) and (Liu et al., 2015)). Sur-
prisingly enough, we get that when the firm pursues an add strategy the 
firm accelerates investing in a more uncertain economic environment. 
The intuition for our result is that investing according to the add strategy 
creates the option to replace and the value of this option increases if the 
economic environment gets more uncertain. A similar result is obtained 
by Yatsenko and Hritonenko (2017). They study a machine replacement 
problem and find that cost uncertainty accelerates investment when 
they consider technological uncertainty. The reason for this result is that 
in their model cost-saving technological change has smaller future gains 
due to exponentially decreasing effectiveness. 
Since abolishment of producing the established product is an irre-
versible decision, the switch from an add to a replace strategy takes 
place later if there is more uncertainty. This all implies that, when the 
economic environment is more uncertain, the firm is more inclined to 
keep on producing the established product after it has introduced the 
new product. 
Applying an add strategy implies that the firm’s capacity investment 
associated with the innovative product will be smaller than in the case of 
the replace strategy. The reason is that when the firm keeps on pro-
ducing both products, increasing capacity of the new product, and thus 
selling more of that product, cannibalizes sales of the established 
product. If the initial size of the new product market is small, a firm will 
prefer the add above the replace strategy. Then the firm invests less in 
new product capacity and it will require that the market of the new 
product has to grow more before the firm will decide to stop selling the 
established product. 
A third major result is that a non-monotonicity in the innovation 
decision arises when the size of the new product market is stable. In such 
a case it could happen that when a new product with a higher quality 
level is available, still it is not optimal for the firm to innovate, while at 
the same time it is optimal to do so and apply the add strategy when this 
quality level is lower. This typically happens if it can be expected that a 
new innovation will arrive soon, so that the quality of the best available 
new product increases and a replace strategy will be optimal. Since a 
replace strategy goes along with a larger capacity investment, optimality 
of this investment requires existence of high demand for the new 
product, which should thus be of high quality. 
If upon innovation the quality, and thus demand, of the new product 
is high, the firm will carry out a large capacity investment. This implies 
that the firm will more often choose a replace strategy. Only in the case 
that the initial size of the new product market is low, it will pursue the 
add strategy. However, then still the firm will change to the replace 
strategy relatively soon. In other words it will stop producing the 
established product as soon as the new product market has reached a 
larger but still relatively small size. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The model setup 
is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 presents the solution, first deriving 
the optimal time to switch from add to replace in Section 3.1, then the 
optimal capacity level of the new product in Section 3.2, and finally the 
optimal innovation time in Section 3.3. The economic analysis of the 
results is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. All proofs can be 
found in the appendix. The appendix also contains a list of the main 
symbols used along the paper presented in Table 1. 
2. Model 
We consider a firm that is currently producing an established product 
1 https://www.economist.com/business/2018/01/25/gm-takes-an-unexpe 
cted-lead-in-the-race-to-develop-autonomous-vehicles.  
2 A recent study on R&D investments is carried out by Peters et al. (2017). 
They employ data of German manufacturing firms to analyze the effect of R&D 
choice, product and process innovations, on future productivity and profits. 
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with price p0 = ξ0 − αK0,
p0 = ξ0 − αK0, (1)  
where K0 is the installed capacity and ξ0 > αK0. ξ0 is the maximum 
willingness to pay for the established product and α > 0 is a constant 
parameter reflecting the sensitivity of the quantity with respect to the 
price. Similar to (Marvel et al., 1997), (Anand and Girotra, 2007), 
(Goyal and Netessine, 2007) and (Huisman and Kort, 2015), we assume 
that the firm produces up to capacity.3 The instantaneous profit on the 
established product market then equals 
π0 =(ξ0 − αK0)K0. (2) 
The development of technologies over time is governed by an un-
certain process, which is exogenous to the firm. Similar to (Farzin et al., 
1998) and (Huisman, 2001), the state of the technological progress is 
given by a compound Poisson process, θ = {θt , t≥ 0}. We may express 
θt = θ0 + uNt, (3)  
where θ0 denotes the state of technology at the initial point in time, u >
0 is the jump size and {Nt , t≥ 0} follows a homogeneous Poisson process 
with rate λ > 0. This implies that new technologies arrive at rate λ, 
where each arrival increases the technology level by u. Note that the 
process θ is non-decreasing over time, reflecting the non-declining na-
ture of technological progress. The aircraft industry is only one example, 
where ongoing innovations play a crucial role in the decision process. 
This industry faces a coming wave of technological change, including 
“engine electrification, artificial intelligence and advanced connectivity 
that would change how aircraft are developed, manufactured, flown, 
powered and serviced. It means increased use of new materials (see 
article) and 3D printing, and greater efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas 
emissions” (The Economist, April 11th, 2019).4 
Adopting a new technology allows the firm to introduce a new and 
more innovative product to the market. To do so it has to incur a sunk 
cost δK1, where δ is the unit investment cost and K1 is the capacity level 
of the new product. Also for the new product, we assume that the firm 
produces up to capacity. We denote the time of adoption of the new 
technology by τ1. At the moment of adoption the firm also has to decide 
in how much capacity K1 to invest in order to produce the innovative 
product. When adopting new technology, the firm has two options. It 
can either add the new product to the product portfolio (for a certain 
time) or abolish the production of the established product and replacing 
it by the innovative one. In case the firm decides to replace the first 
product by the new one, the price of the new product is given by the 
following inverse demand function 
pR1 (Xt, θτ1 )= (θτ1 − αK1)Xt. (4) 
Note that the price of the new product is positively influenced by the 
state of technological progress θ. The larger θ is, the more advanced is 
the new product, and the higher the price the consumers are willing to 
pay for it. The sensitivity of quantity with respect to price is influenced 
by the same parameter α. Furthermore, we assume that demand for the 
new product develops in an uncertain way. Uncertainty is introduced via 
the stochastic demand shift parameter X = {Xt , t≥ τ1} that is assumed to 
follow a geometric Brownian motion with drift μ and volatility σ > 0: 
dXt = μXtdt + σXtdzt, with Xτ1 = x, (5)  
in which dzt is the increment of a Wiener process. The firm knows the 
value of X at the innovation time τ1, so that Xτ1 = x, where x is a 
parameter. We impose that r − μ > 0, where r > 0 is the (constant) in-
terest rate. This is a standard assumption, that guarantees that the 
optimal investment time is finite (therewith, excluding trivial cases), as 
in this case the expected value of the project in perpetuity is finite. The 
value of the drift μ depends on the scenario under consideration. Our 
analysis allows for both positive and negative values of the drift 
parameter. In the numerical example of Section 4 we let μ admit a 
neutral value in that we fix it to be equal to zero. 
We assume the following utility function when the firm is producing 
both products (the established and the new one), 
U = ξ0K0 −
1
2
αK20 − γK0K1x + θK1x −
1
2
αK21 x − p0K0 − p1K1, (6)  
where γ represents the horizontal differentiation parameter. We assume 
γ to be positive to reflect that the two products are strategic substitutes. 
From this utility function, the following demand system can be 
derived for the established and the new product: 
pA0 (Xt, θτ1 )= ξ0 − αK0 − γK1Xt, (7)  
pA1 (Xt, θτ1 )= (θτ1 − αK1 − γK0)Xt. (8) 
The upper bound of γ is given by α, i.e. γ < α, meaning that it can 
never be the case that the quantity of the other product has a larger 
effect on the product price than the quantity of the product itself. In 
order to make sure that the price of the old market stays positive 
everywhere, implying that X should not get too large before the firm 
decides to abolish the established product, we need to impose the 
additional assumption r+ μ > σ2. 
After adoption of the new technology at the moment τ1, demand on 
the established market also becomes uncertain. This is due to the fact 
that the variation of the demand of the new product influences the de-
mand of the established one through the cannibalization effect. This is 
represented by the term − γK1Xt in expression (7). Therewith, the 
instantaneous profit functions are given by 
πR1 (Xt, θτ1 )= (θτ1 − αK1)XtK1, t ≥ τ1, (9)  
for the case that only the new product is produced, and 
πA1 (Xt, θτ1 )= (ξ0 − αK0 − γK1Xt)K0 +(θτ1 − αK1 − γK0)XtK1, t ≥ τ1, (10)  
in case that both products are produced. After having decided to add the 
innovative product to the established one, the firm will eventually 
abandon the established product, which happens at the moment that the 
price of the established product falls too low. We denote the time of 
abandonment of the established product by τ2. The possible timelines of 
the problem are described in Fig. 1. As can been seen in the left graph of 
Fig. 1 the price of the new product jumps upwards once the firm decides 
to abolish the old product. This effect is due to the fact that we consider 
the firm to be the only actor in the market. If consumers can suddenly 
not buy an old generation of some product anymore, they have to look 
for an alternative. Therefore, they end up being one of the potential 
consumers of the new product. As a consequence, the demand and 
therefore, the price of this new product jump up. 

























with 3 (Goyal and Netessine, 2007) state that firms may find it difficult to produce 
below capacity due to fixed costs associated with, for example, production 
ramp-up, commitments to suppliers and labor. See (Dangl, 1999) and (Hagspiel 
et al., 2016) for studies that release this assumption.  
4 https://www.economist.com/business/2019/04/11/airbus-risks-losing-its- 
competitive-thrust. 
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πA1 (Xs, θτ1 )e− r(s− τ1)ds+
∫+∞
τ2











Note that the value function depends on the initial state of the 
technology, θ0 = θ. The process θ is a compound Poisson process (as 
presented in Equation (3)), and thus increases in its initial level, θ. Since 
θ governs both the profitability of innovating and the relative advantage 
of the new versus the old product, it can be expected that both τ1 and τ2 
are dependent on θ. Moreover, the value function, besides depending on 
the current state of the technology, θ, also depends explicitly on Xτ1 = x. 
This assumption is based on the fact that companies in general perform 
marketing analysis and demand forecasts for new products, which form 
the basis for deciding the value of the parameter x. After the product is 
launched the demand will change stochastically based on how it is 
received in the market (as shown in Equation (5)). Furthermore, note 
that the second decision, i.e. when the firm abandons the old product 
and only produces the new product (see Equation (12)), depends on the 
value of both processes at moment τ1: Xτ1 and θτ1 . Whereas Xτ1 is 
considered to be constant and equal to x, θτ1 is a random variable given 
by θτ1 = θ0 + uNτ1 , where Nτ1 represents the number of new technologies 
developed until time τ1. 
Finally, note that τ1 could be equal to τ2, which is the case when the 
firm decides to replace upon innovating. One extreme example of im-
mediate replacement is the fact that luxury companies often destroy 
unsold inventory in order to avoid cannibalization. In this way they 
maintain the scarcity of their goods (The Wall Street Journal, September 
6, 2018 5). 
3. Model solution 
In order to solve the optimization problem, we first rewrite the 
optimization problem (11) in a simpler way by applying the strong 












, (13)  
where we use Eθ0=θ[…] to denote the conditional expectation E[…|θ0 = θ]
in order to ease notation. The function ρ is defined as follows 
ρ(x, θ,K1)= v(x, θ,K1) − δK1 −
π0
r









πA1 (Xτ1+s, θ)e− rsds+
∫+∞
τ




with EXτ1=x[…] being the conditional expectation E[…|Xτ1 = x]. 
This representation highlights that we solve the problem in a 
sequential manner starting backwards. First we solve the optimization 
problem in (15) for the optimal time to eventually replace the old 
product after having produced both products for a certain time upon 
technology adoption. Then we derive for each (x, θ) whether it is optimal 
to add or replace upon investment and we determine the corresponding 
capacity level. Finally, we derive the optimal investment thresholds. 
In the following subsections we address the three steps in order to 
solve the problem presented in (13). To shorten notation we will refrain 
from denoting all functional arguments there where it does not create 
confusion. 
3.1. When to switch from add to replace 
We first determine, given the firm has decided to apply the add 
strategy upon innovation, when to eventually abolish the established 
product. This means we solve the optimal stopping problem presented in 
(15). To do so we start out with stating the payoff resulting from the add 






r − μ +
(θ − αK1 − γK0)K1x


































The payoff of the add strategy can be explained as follows. The first 
term stands for the value of the option to abandon the established 
product. The second and the third term are equal to the expected dis-
counted revenue stream of selling the established product. The final 
term represents the expected discounted revenue stream of the sales of 
the new product. After abolishing the old product the firm’s value is 
equal to the payoff of the replace strategy given by 
Fig. 1. Possible timelines for the decision problem.  
5 https://www.wsj.com/articles/burning-luxury-goods-goes-out-of-style-at- 
burberry-1536238351. 
V. Hagspiel et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                




r − μ . (19) 
The firm abolishes the established product as soon as the process X 









To explain this threshold we rewrite this expression as follows 
2γK0K1X⋆






This shows that the decision to abolish producing the established 
product is in fact equal to taking an irreversible investment with sunk 
costs π0r in order to get rid of the cannibalization effect represented by the 
left side of equation (21). β1β1 − 1 is the familiar term known from real op-
tions theory representing the value of waiting. This value of waiting 
increases with uncertainty indicating that the firm will abolish the 
established product later when the economic environment is more un-
certain. Note that the threshold X⋆ is decreasing in K1, reflecting that the 
decision to go from the add to the replace strategy is more profitable 
when the cannibalization effect is large. 
3.2. Capacity level of the new product K1 
Here we determine the optimal capacity level for both the add and 
replace strategy. 
It follows from (20) that the cannibalization effect introduces an 








, (22)  
we see that capacity larger than Kbx makes cannibalization too expensive 
for the add strategy. Therefore, replace is the optimal choice. 
So when the firm wants to install a capacity level such that K1 > Kbx , 
this can only be optimal when it applies the replace strategy. Note that 
analogously it can be derived that for capacity levels lower than Kbx only 
the add strategy needs to be considered. We conclude that in order to 
































This leads to the results presented in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. • Given that it is optimal to add, the capacity level of the 
new product depends on the value of β1.  
– For parameter values such that β1 = 2, the capacity 













]. (24)     














θ − 2γK0 − 2αKA1
r − μ x = δ. (25) 
For 1 < β1 < 2, KA1 is equal to the largest root of this equation and for 
β1 > 2, it is equal to the smallest one.  
• Given that it is optimal to replace, the capacity level of the new product is 
equal to 
KR1 =
θx − δ(r − μ)
2αx . (26) 
As a special case we study the scenario where the demand for the new 
product is constant, i.e. μ = σ = 0. Proposition 2 presents the resulting ca-
pacity size of the new product for this case. 
Proposition 2. In the following assume that μ = σ = 0.  
• Given that it is optimal to add, the capacity level of the new product is 
equal to 
KA1 =
(θ − 2γK0)x − δr
2αx . (27)    




2αx . (28) 
It can be easily verified that these capacity sizes are the result of taking the 
first order conditions of the value functions given in equations (16) and (19). 
Note that for this case the trend μ is equal to zero and the option to replace 
after having added is worthless. Since the demand of the new product is 
constant over time, it holds that if the add strategy is optimal upon innovation 
it is always optimal. 
By now it is clear that the choice of the capacity level for the new product 
depends on whether the firm will keep on producing the established product. 
Therefore, the last part of this section is devoted to the choice between the add 
and the replace strategy. The following proposition gives an expression for the 
boundary between the add and the replace region in the (θ,x) plane. 
Proposition 3. Given that it is optimal for the firm to innovate, the 
indifference curve, θb, between the regions where it is optimal to add or to 
replace is obtained when the two terms of the maximization in (23) are equal. 
The indifference curve is given by 
θb(x)=
δ(r − μ) + 2αKb
x
. (29) 
For obvious reasons, we call this curve the add/replace boundary. Note 
that this boundary (29) is a decreasing function of x. This makes sense, 
because a larger market for the new product makes it more profitable to just 
produce the new product and abolish the established one. In the following 
proposition we study how θb depends on several parameters. 
Proposition 4. The add/replace boundary, θb, defined in (29), decreases 
with γ,K0 and μ; increases with δ, ξ0 and σ; and does not depend on λ and u. 
Regarding α and r it holds that.  
• for α1 < α2, if α1 + α2 < ξ0K0 then θb(x; α1) < θb(x; α2), otherwise 
θb(x;α1) > θb(x;α2);  








> 0 then 
θb(x; r1) < θb(x; r2), otherwise θb(x; r1) > θb(x; r2). 
The results of this proposition can be nicely economically inter-
preted. The degree of horizontal differentiation is large when the 
parameter γ is small. Therefore, the established and the innovative 
product are especially competing if γ is large, which results in a large 
cannibalization effect. This makes it less profitable to produce both 
products at the same time. Therefore, the replace strategy will be more 
attractive for a higher value of γ, which explains that the add/replace 
boundary decreases with γ. If the firm produces a lot of the established 
product, i.e. K0 is large, this reduces the output price of the new product 
a lot. This explains that the add strategy is less profitable in such a sit-
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uation. If demand for the new product is expected to grow faster over 
time, i.e. μ increases, the new product market is more profitable making 
it more attractive for the firm to be solely active on this market and stop 
with producing the established product. Hence, the add/replace 
boundary decreases with. μ.
If the unit investment cost δ is large, the firm invests less in capacity 
of the new product. This reduces the cannibalization effect, making it 
more attractive to also produce the established product. This explains 
that the add/replace boundary is increasing with δ. If ξ0 increases, the 
established product becomes more profitable. Therefore, the firm pre-
fers producing it and thus the add/replace boundary is increasing with 
this parameter. An increase of the uncertainty parameter σ causes an 
increase of the value of the option to abandon the established product. 
Therefore, the firm wants to acquire this option, which makes the add 
strategy more attractive, and the add/replace boundary increases with 
σ. 
The parameters λ and u govern the speed of technological progress. 
This is not relevant anymore in the stopping region where the firm has 
already innovated, which explains why these parameters do not influ-
ence the add/replace boundary. 
The effect of α is more involved because this parameter covers both 
the negative effect of the quantity of the established and the new product 
on their respective output prices. So, on the one hand an increased level 
of α reduces the profitability of the established product. On the other 
hand is also the new product less profitable, and, moreover, α also has an 
effect on the chosen capacity size K1. 
Similarly, increasing the discount rate r has multiple effects. First, 
since it reduces the net present value of an investment, the firm will 
invest less in capacity for the new product. This in turn reduces the 
cannibalization, and therefore it is more profitable to simultaneously 
produce the established and the new product.On the other hand, an 
increased discount rate decreases the value of the option to abandon the 
established product, which diminishes the attractiveness of the add 
strategy. 
3.3. When to innovate 
The decision of when to innovate depends on the level of θ. The 
larger θ the more profitable the current innovation is. It follows that it is 
optimal to innovate once θ is large enough, i.e. when it passes some 
threshold level θ*. The next proposition presents this threshold level 
given that the firm applies the replace strategy upon innovating. For the 
add strategy only a numerical approximation is available, for which we 
present the algorithm in Appendix A.5. 
Proposition 5. When the optimal decision is to replace immediately, the 












λ(λ + r) + 4α(r − μ) π0
rx
√
. (30)   
4. Economic analysis 
This section is organized as follows. First, we consider the case where 
demand of the innovative product is constant. Here we compare our 
results to the findings of Hagspiel et al. (2019) who analyze the problem 
without capacity optimization. We then proceed by analyzing the gen-
eral case where demand of the innovative product is stochastic. 
4.1. Constant demand innovative product 
A typical solution of the problem with constant demand of the 
innovative product is presented in Fig. 3. Note that in this case, before 
the innovation is undertaken the movement in the (θ, x)-plane takes 
place vertically with upward jumps. After the innovation the movement 
stops and constant demand means that there is also no horizontal 
movement. Fig. 3 shows that it is optimal to innovate when the tech-
nology level θ is sufficiently large. We also see that next to the innovative 
product the firm keeps on producing the established product if the 
innovative product market is small, i.e. x is small. If the technology level 
is larger, the firm wants to invest in a larger capacity level for the 
innovative product. Then the replace strategy becomes more profitable 
compared to the add strategy. This is because it is optimal for the firm to 
invest in a larger capacity level for the innovative product for the replace 
strategy. For the add strategy the drawback of installing a larger ca-
pacity is that the innovative product cannibalizes a larger part of the 
revenue of the established product. This makes the add strategy less 
profitable compared to replace. Fig. 3 confirms this by illustrating that 
the add/replace boundary is decreasing in the (x, θ)-plane. Note that if 
the firm does not optimize capacity this effect would not appear. 
Therefore, as already shown by Hagspiel et al. (2019), the boundary 
between the add and replace region would be vertical as illustrated in 
Fig. 2. 
An interesting feature that occurs in Fig. 3 is the inaction region that 
arises between the add and replace region. This inaction region implies a 
non-monotonicity in the innovation decision in the sense that when a 
new product with a higher quality level is available it is not optimal to 
innovate whereas it is optimal to do so applying the add strategy when 
this level is lower. The intuition is that innovating in the replace region 
goes along with a larger capacity investment. So, in this inaction region 
the potential quality of the new product is still not good enough to justify 
a replace-innovation decision. Of course, it is always optimal to replace 
once the θ is sufficiently large. Such an inaction region never occurs 
when capacity investment size is assumed to be fixed as can be seen in 
Fig. 2. Strategy state space diagram where the demand of the innovative 
product is constant without capacity optimization. [Parameter values: ξ0 = 1, 
α = 0.07, γ = 0.05, δ = 1, μ = σ = 0, r = 0.1, λ = 0.1, u = 0.2 and K0 = K1 =
ξ0/2α ≈ 7.14.]. 
Fig. 3. Strategy state space diagram where the demand of the innovative 
product is constant. [Parameter values: ξ0 = 1, α = 0.07, γ = 0.05, δ = 1, μ =
σ = 0, r = 0.1, λ = 0.1, u = 0.2 and K0 = ξ0/2α ≈ 7.14.]. 
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Fig. 2 (see (Hagspiel et al., 2019)). 
4.2. Stochastic demand innovative product 
We now consider the general case that the demand of the innovative 
product is stochastic. In the (θ, x)-plane this implies that after the 
innovation there are continuous horizontal movements. Introducing 
uncertainty related to the demand level of the new product implies that 
at some point it can be optimal for the firm to switch to the replace 
strategy after having originally decided to produce both products at the 
same time. The firm in fact receives the option to replace upon investing 
in the add region. It will exercise this option once the demand level for 
the innovative product is sufficiently large. The reason is that also the 
cannibalization effect grows with x, making the add strategy less prof-
itable. This replace option value increases with uncertainty. Therefore, 
the incentive to invest in the add strategy goes up. In Fig. 4 this is re-
flected by a lower boundary for the add region for larger σ. 
The add region is also expanding on the right side of the (x,θ)-plane 
as illustrated in Fig. 4. Since the value of adding increases in σ (due to 
the added option value), and the value of replacing does not change, the 
relative attractiveness of adding versus replacing improves. 
As can be seen in Fig. 4, this means that the boundary separating the 
two stopping regions moves to the right. So, essentially what we can 
conclude from Fig. 4 is that the add region expands with uncertainty. In 
fact, the following proposition formally shows that the value of applying 
the add strategy increases with the uncertainty parameter σ.
Proposition 6. The value of the firm when the optimal strategy is to add 











increases with σ. The explanation rests on the fact that option values 
increase with uncertainty. This implies that in a more uncertain eco-
nomic environment the firm keeps an option alive for a longer time, or is 
more eager to acquire an option. The first explains why after innovating 
the firm prefers to keep on producing the established product when 
there is a lot of uncertainty. In this way it still holds the valuable option 
to abandon this product at some time in the future. The second explains 
that when applying the add strategy uncertainty accelerates investment: 
by investing the firm acquires the option to switch from add to replace at 
some point in the future. 
These two effects of changing the uncertainty (σ) in the demand shift 
parameter x are consistent with the real options literature (see (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994)). The underlying reasons may be interpreted most 
readily in the context of two different scenarios the firm may find itself 
in:  
1. The decision maker has chosen to add (i.e. producing both the old 
and new product simultaneously) after having acquired the capacity 
K1 for the new product. At every point in time, the decision maker 
needs to choose between continuing like this or to scrap/abandon the 
old product (producing only the new product). In Fig. 4 the firm 
enters the add-region at point a for either the case when σ = 0.2 or 
σ = 0.5. As expected, and illustrated by points A1 and A2, the deci-
sion maker will abandon the old product later (i.e. for a higher x- 
value) when the uncertainty is larger.  
2. Only the old product is being produced and at every point in time the 
firm needs to choose between continuing or innovating; if innovating 
is chosen, then it should be either the add or the replace strategy. 
Increasing the uncertainty (σ) in the demand shift parameter x does 
not change the value of the replace strategy or the dynamics in the 
continuation region (since only the development of the technology is 
uncertain at that point), but it does unambiguously increase the 
value of choosing the add strategy as explained above and more 
formally in Proposition 6. As illustrated in Fig. 4, increasing σ 
therefore results in a replace boundary that is unchanged (where this 
is still the optimal strategy) and boundaries for the add region that 
expands in all directions, also at the expense of the replace region. 
It is important to note that the boundary separating the add and 
replace strategies inside of the stopping region is not an exercise 
boundary. This boundary only indicates which is the better strategy to 
choose when entering the stopping region. The optimal exercise 
threshold for replacing after one has first chosen the add strategy de-
pends on which initial point (x, θ), and at what capacity K1, the add- 
decision was first made, as can be seen from expressions (20) and 
(25). Both for higher levels of x and θ a larger capacity will be chosen for 
the add strategy. In both cases this leads to a lower replacement 
threshold X*. This effect is illustrated in Fig. 5 for three different starting 
points a, b and c, in the add region. 
Comparing points a and c shows an example of entering the stopping 
region at two different values of θ for the same initial demand level of 
the new market. Indeed for the larger θ the capacity investment is larger. 
In the case of point a, the optimal capacity is equal to K1 = 4.1 and for 
point c, equal to K1 = 6.5. Therefore, the firm replaces earlier due to the 
larger cannibalization effect. This can be seen comparing points A and C, 
where C is located more to the left so that x has a lower value there. The 
same can be observed comparing points a and b. A larger initial demand 
level of the new market (i.e. larger x) for the same new product quality 
leads to a larger capacity investment. Specifically, for point b, K1 = 5.8. 
Therefore, for this case earlier exercise of the replace strategy is optimal. 
The latter can be inferred from the fact that point B is associated with a 
smaller x than point A. 
A major difference between the constant demand solution illustrated 
Fig. 4. Strategy state space diagram for different levels of uncertainty σ. 
[Parameter values: ξ0 = 1, α = 0.07, γ = 0.05, δ = 1, μ = 0, r = 0.1, λ = 0.1, 
u = 0.2 and K0 = ξ0/2α ≈ 7.14.]. 
Fig. 5. Strategy state space diagram indicating optimal add and replace de-
cisions for different levels of x and θ. [Parameter values: ξ0 = 1, α = 0.07, γ =
0.05, δ = 1, μ = 0, σ = 0.2, r = 0.1, λ = 0.1, u = 0.2 and K0 = ξ0/2α ≈ 7.14.]. 
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in Fig. 3 and the stochastic demand solution, is that in the latter case no 
inaction region arises in the sense that for a relatively low θ and a 
relatively high θ the firm innovates, while it waits for intermediate 
values of θ. The reason is that due to the uncertainty the value of X is 
fluctuating. Therefore, it can be expected that if a firm adopts an add 
strategy while being close to replace in fact the replace region will be 
entered soon. The firm will anticipate this change to a replace strategy 
by choosing a larger capacity size. If σ is sufficiently small then an 
inaction region can again occur as in the constant demand case. 
5. Conclusion 
This article considers a firm being active on an established product 
market, which has an option to carry out a product innovation. In 
exercising this option there is a value of waiting, because innovating at a 
later point in time makes that the new product is of better quality due to 
technological progress. The obvious trade-off is that at the same time 
there is an opportunity cost of waiting in that, as long as the firm does 
not innovate, it misses the profit generated by being active on an 
innovative product market. This article solves this timing problem by 
determining a threshold value for the state of the technological progress 
indicating that it is optimal for the firm to innovate once this threshold is 
reached. 
The article also focuses on the problem of what the firm should do 
with its established product after it has innovated. Essentially there are 
two possibilities in that, first, the firm stops activities on the established 
product market at the moment that it launches the new product, 
implying that the firm replaces the established product by the new one. 
Second, after it has innovated, the firm keeps on producing its estab-
lished product so that it adds the new product to its existing product 
portfolio. In the latter case it still has the option to go for the replace 
strategy, thus abolishing the established product, once the innovative 
product market has grown sufficiently. We find that, compared to the 
replace option, the add strategy goes along with a lower capacity in-
vestment, because sales of the new product take away demand from the 
established product and vice versa. One of our main results is that for 
higher levels of uncertainty in the innovative product market, the firm 
invests sooner given it adopts the add strategy. 
One simplifying assumption in our current model is that the estab-
lished product capacity is given. An interesting extension could be to 
look at the problem of how the option of a product innovation could 
influence capacity investments in the current product. Related to this, 
one could investigate whether the model may be extended to consider a 
(potentially perpetual) sequence of capacity and add-or-replace de-
cisions for an arbitrary number of new products. Another feature we did 
not take into account is competition. So, another interesting extension 
would be to analyze our innovation model in an incumbent-entrant 
framework or a duopoly. An idea here is to combine the current 
model with the duopoly analyzed in Huisman and Kort (2015). 
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A. Appendix 
A.1. List of symbols  
Table 1 
List of relevant notation used in the article.  
Processes X = {Xt , t≥ τ1} demand at time t 
Xt ∈ R+
θ = {θt , t≥ 0} state of the technology at time t 
θt = θ0 + uNt , θ0,u > 0  
{Nt , t≥ 0} number of new technologies arrived until time t 
Nt ∈ N  
Parameters x, x > 0  initial demand for the new product 
K0, K0 > 0  installed capacity of the established product 
α, α > 0  sensitivity of the quantity w.r.t. price 
ξ0, ξ0 > αK0  maximum willingness to pay for the established product 
γ, 0 < γ < α  horizontal differentiation 
δ, δ > 0  unitary investment cost 
λ, λ > 0  intensity of arrival of new technologies 
u, u > 0  jump size of arrival of new technologies 
μ, μ ∈ R  drift of the demand 
σ, σ > 0  volatility of the demand 
r, r > μ  interest rate 
Products p0  price of the established product 
pR1  price of the new product, in case of replace strategy 
pA0 ⋅(pA1 ) price of the established (new) product, in case of add strategy 
Optimal quantities X*  price at which the established product stops being produced 
Kb  upper bound for the capacity, in case the add strategy is chosen 
KA1 ⋅(KR1 ) optimal capacity of the innovative product in add (replace) strategy 
θ⋆(x) level of technology where the firm innovates 
θb(x) indifference curve between add or replace  
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1 
The proof of (26) - the replace case - is trivial, and therefore we just show the proofs for the add case. For this case, we need to maximize the 
following function w.r.t. K1: 
f (K1)=A(K1)xβ1 +
(θ − αK1 − 2γK0)K1x
r − μ − δK1, (31) 
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(θ − 2αK1 − 2γK0)x
r − μ − δ,
where Kb is defined in (22). Therefore the zeros of its first order derivative are solution of equation (25) .6 In case β1 = 2 then f
′ is an increasing linear 
function, and thus the minimum of f may be computed explicitly, being KA1 given by (24). In case β1 ∕= 2, then in general we are not able to find the 












As f ′′ has a unique zero, it follows that this is the unique inflection point of f. Then, given that f(0) = 0,  
• in case 1 < β1 < 2, the function is convex until that inflection point, and afterwards is concave. Thus, the maximizer of f w.r.t. K1 must be the larger 
solution of (25).  
• in case β > 2, then the function is concave until the inflection point, and afterwards is convex. Thus, the maximizer of f w.r.t. K1 must be the 
smallest solution of (25). 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2 
In this case, the price after investment in the new product is also known, and equal to x. Moreover, upon investment in the new price, the decision 
to replace or to add does not change with time, as x is fixed. Indeed, regarding equation (11), either τ1 = τ2, and therefore the firm replaces the old 
product by the new one as soon as it invests, or τ2 = ∞, and therefore it produces both forever (see (Hagspiel et al., 2019) for more details). Then the 
maximization problem boils down into the following maximization problems:  
• in case the firm produces both products forever, its return is 
∫ +∞
0
πA1 (x, θ)e− rsds − δK1 =
πA1 (x, θ)
r
− δK1    
• Maximizing it w.r.t. K1 gives the expression provided in equation (27).  
• in case the firm produces only the new product forever, its return is: 
∫ +∞
0
πR1 (x, θ)e− rsds − δK1 =
πR1 (x, θ)
r
− δK1    
• Therefore, maximizing it w.r.t. K1 gives precisely (28). 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3 
For (x, θ) in the indifference curve, KA1 and KR1 are equal. Thus, KR1 should verify Equation (25) for these pairs. Then, plugging (26) into (25), one 
obtains the expression for θb presented in (29). 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4 
We want to investigate how θb, defined in (29), changes with the different parameters. It is easy to see that θb(x) = δ(r− μ)+2αKbx does not depend on λ 
and u, increases with δ, and has the same monotony as Kb (defined in (22)) for σ, γ, ξ0 and K0. It remains to study the μ, α and r cases. 
Note that θb, as a function of μ, can be written as 1x
[




. Then, we need to study ϱ1(μ) = (r − μ)
β1(μ)
β1(μ)− 1








2 , which can be simplified as ϱ1
′
(μ) = − β1(μ)σ2∇ [σ









. After some calculations we 
end up with ϱ1
′














































] < 0. Given that (r − μ) β1(μ)β1(μ)− 1 is a decreasing function of μ, we conclude that θb decreases with μ too. 











. Note that ϱ2
′
(r) =
6 In this proof we are considering the case where f ′ has two zeros. The cases where f ′ has no zeros or only one zero can be considered, leading to much more 
complex derivations. The complete analysis can be found in Appendix 5.C of Pimentel (2018). 
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]]< 0.






, we have7 











= δ(r2 − r1) +
απ0
γK0
[ϱ2(r2) − ϱ2(r1)]. (33) 








> 0 the θb increases and decreases otherwise. 
To investigate the α case, we need to study the function ϱ4(α) = α(ξ0 − αK0) for 0 < α <
ξ0
K0. Given that ϱ4 is a concave function with zeros on 0 and 
ξ0
K0, then it is not monotonic. Let us consider α1 < α2. Then ϱ4(α2) − ϱ4(α1) > 0 ⇔ (α2 − α1)[ξ0 − (α1 + α2)K0]〉0 ⇔ α1 + α2 <
ξ0
K0. Consequently, if α1+
α2 < ξ0K0 the θb increases with α and decreases otherwise. 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5 
Given that here we are interested on studying the functions regarding to θ, we write the dependency on x as a subscript. 
In order to prove the result, we use Theorem 1, Section 3.3. of Hagspiel et al. (2019). In view of such result, we need to consider the function 
hx(θ)= (r+ λ)ψR(x, θ) − λψR(x, θ+ u), (34)  
with ψRx (θ) = ρx(θ,KR1 ) = vRx (θ,KR1 ) − δKR1 −
π0
r , where ρ and vR are defined in (14) and (19), respectively, and KR1 is given by (26). We need to prove that 
the function h, as a function of θ, has only one zero, and it is positive after this zero. At the same time we prove that such a point is precisely θ*R(x) given 
by (30). 
After some calculations, we get 
hx(θ)=




4α(r − μ)x , (35)  
which is a convex quadratic function and its minimum is attained at δ(r− μ)x +
uλ
r . Doing some more calculations we can prove that θ
⋆





r , which implies that hx(θ) > 0,∀ θ > θ
⋆
R(x), which proves the proposition. 
■ 
A.7. Proof of Proposition 6 













vA(x, θ,K1(σ2); σ2) − δK1(σ2)
]
.
As a first step, we will prove that, for a fixed pair (x,θ), and a fixed K1, such that K1 < Kb(σ)x , v
A increases with σ. We can observe from Expression (16) 
that only the first term of vA depends on σ. Let us define the function g(σ) = Axβ1(σ). Taking into account the definition of A given by (17), we can 









































Considering the definition of Kb in (22), it is straightforward to show that Kb
′

















7 Note that ϱ2(r2) − ϱ2(r1) < 0 because ϱ2 decreases with r. 
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< 0. Moreover, it is simple to show that β1
′
(σ) < 0. These two results together, and also the fact that β1(σ) > 1, 
imply that g′ (σ) > 0. Thus, vA increases with σ. 










x, θ,K⋆1 (σ1); σ1
)
− δK⋆1 (σ1).
Given that vA increases with σ, we can say that8 
vA
(
x, θ,K⋆1 (σ1); σ1
)
− δK⋆1 (σ1)≤ vA
(
x, θ,K⋆1 (σ1); σ2
)
− δK⋆1 (σ1).
However, the optimal capacity when the volatility is σ2 is K⋆1 (σ2), thus any other capacity is sub-optimal, i.e. 
vA
(
x, θ,K⋆1 (σ1); σ2
)
− δK⋆1 (σ1)≤ vA
(








vA(x, θ,K1(σ2); σ2) − δK1(σ2)
]
,
which concludes the proof. 
■ 
A.8. Algorithm for the numerical approximation 
In the following we state the pseudo-code for the numerical approximation.   
Algorithm 1 Numerical approximation 
% Create equispaced vectors for x and theta, with spacing “gridSpacing” (jump-size needs to be divisible by the spacing- 
size for theta) and vector-length of M 
xVector = vector(start = xStart, end = xEnd, spacing = gridSpacing, length = M) 
thetaVector = vector(start = thetaStart, end = thetaEnd, spacing = gridSpacing, length = M) 
% Create matrix/grid for the total asset value based on the possible x- and theta-values 
assetValue = matrix(rows = M, columns = M) 
% Determine how many indices a jump (of size u) equates to in the theta-vector 
indexJumpSize = u/gridSpacing 
% Outer-loop; loop through each possible x-value 
For (i = 1 to M){ 
% Inner-loop 1; loop through the theta-values which are less than one jump away from the largest theta-value, 
starting with the largest value: thetaVector[M]. Assume that one must either invest (adding or replacing) or the value is 
set to 0 
For (j = M to (M-indexJumpSize+1)){ 
% Solve equation (19) numerically to find optimal capacity if adding and plug into equation (20) to get the 
optimal capacity if replacing. 
stoppingValue = max(addValue, replaceValue) -π0/r % As in equation (17) 
assetValue[i,j] = max(stoppingValue,0) 
} 
% Inner-loop 2; loop through the theta-values which are more than (or equal to) one jump away from the largest 
theta-value, starting with the largest value: thetaVector[M-indexJumpSize]. The maximum value is chosen between 
either investing (adding or replacing) or waiting (the discounted value one jump away) 
For (j = (M - indexJumpSize) to 1){ 
% Solve equation (19) numerically to find optimal capacity if adding and plug into equation (20) to get the 
optimal capacity if replacing. 
stoppingValue = max(addValue, replaceValue) -π0/r % As in equation (17) 
waitingValue =
λ
λ + r 
assetValue[i, j + indexJumpSize] 
assetValue[i,j] = max(stoppingValue, waitingValue) 
} 
}   
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